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ABSTRACT
In the context of the spatialities of Europeanisation, we demonstrate the manoeuvrability of
states through the selection and deployment of geopolitical positioning strategies. Specifically,
we highlight how geographic quantities (territory, location, resources, natural conditions) are
bundled together to substantiate a mutable national interest as well as underpin the advocacy by
states of particular geopolitical positionings. We argue that the diplomatic use of geographic
quantities in state-led efforts to structure and shape international interactions has demonstrable
geopolitical consequences. Using the case study of Iceland, one of the first casualties of the
international financial crisis, we examine this state’s geopolitical repositioning towards
‘EUrope’ through use of geographical uniqueness and concomitant reaffirmation of Nordic
closeness. We expose the diplomatic challenges to the use of geographical categories such as
uniqueness in geopolitical (re)positioning towards the emerging ‘EUropean’ order.
Key words: Geopolitics, uniqueness, representation, Iceland, European Union, Nordic
INTRODUCTION
Without doubt the European Union (EU)
means different things in different places, for
‘the politics of integration evokes different
responses, tactics and strategies in different
geographical contexts’ (Moisio et al. 2013, p.
738). The spatialities of Europeanisation
(Jones 2006; Clark & Jones 2008; Jones &
Clark 2010) continue to warrant academic
attention particularly as ‘EUrope’ as idea,
practices and project faces existential threats
from both within and without. We have
always maintained that ‘the ‘tipping point’
for a more liberating Europeanisation is to
be found through empirical analyses of the
workings and operation of contemporary elite
Europeanisation spaces, discourses and prac-
tices’ (Jones & Clark 2010, p. xvi). This has
found support in recent calls for analyses of
the ‘ways in which “Europe” is contested and
played out in political discourses and prac-
tices’ (Moisio et al. 2013, p. 739). Context-
specific geopolitical imaginations are central
to the meaning of ‘EUrope’ for those who
live outside it: for how the European Union
(EU) is constructed within political dis-
courses, how these constructions change and
come under all manner of contestation over
time – as well as require strenuous political-
diplomatic efforts to maintain their dominant
meanings – are vital dimensions of the actual-
isation of ‘EUrope’ beyond its borders.
While the study of the imaginations, visions,
narratives and representations that (re)make
worlds is of course the essence of geopolitics
(Dijkink 1996), we argue that less well under-
stood within geopolitics scholarship are the
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mechanisms by which states and regions out-
side the current EU 28 develop their position-
ing strategies and place brandings to secure
maximum advantages from this emerging
‘EUropean’ order. To this end, and as a con-
tribution to the political geography of Euro-
peanisation, here we examine how ‘EUrope’
is both scripted and contested by ‘outside’
political and diplomatic elites as part of state
(re)positioning strategies. Our emphasis is
specifically upon the geopolitical representa-
tions through which belonging to ‘EUrope’
can be articulated and performed, and state
(re)positioning can be fixed. This process of
(re)positioning is inescapably contested and
fraught with numerous political challenges,
with diplomats expending considerable ener-
gies trying to make geopolitical representa-
tions visible, workable and profitable in their
struggle to co-ordinate geopolitics both at
home and at-a-distance. Building upon work
on European enlargement (Moisio 2002,
2008; Busch & Krzyzanowski 2007; Browning
& Christou 2010; Bialasiewicz 2011), here our
empirical focus is on Iceland, one of the first
casualties of the international financial crisis
and subsequent candidate country for EU
membership (Thorhallsson 2009; Loftsdottir
2010; Clark & Jones 2012; Nielsson & Torfa-
son 2012; Wade & Sigurgeirsdottir 2012; Jones
& Clark 2013; Bergmann 2014).
We contend that from an economic per-
spective, much has been written on how
national economic policies are recast to
attract foreign direct investment under neo-
liberal globalisation. Relaxing taxation
regimes and using grants and subsidies to
boost the attractiveness of territories to cor-
porations are now widely recognised as vital
tools of national economic strategy, allegedly
enabling repositioning of states relative to
their global competitors (Nyseth & Granas
2007). States’ role within this economic repo-
sitioning is pivotal, with a whole strand of lit-
erature emerging on ‘state branding’ that
seeks to understand national responses to
dominant neoliberal imperatives, through
the production and redefinition of national
‘images’ and ‘identities’ to enhance eco-
nomic growth possibilities (Aronczyk 2007).
It seems international capital, banks, and
global financial markets now exert a hege-
monic influence on national economic pol-
icy; however, Payne and Sutton (2007, 2)
note that ‘states still enjoy . . . room for
manoeuvre in the global political economy’.
This verdict, from an economic perspec-
tive, chimes with Taylor and Flint’s (2007)
observation of the continued geopolitical
‘manoeuvrability of states’. Yet compared
with economic analyses, this geopolitical
manoeuvrability – the ways in which states
seek to enhance their global geostrategic
presence – remains relatively under-
examined. We argue here that there are now
three pressing reasons for closer attention to
be paid to the contemporary geopolitical
(re)positioning of states, by which we mean
how political-administrative elites attempt to
shape national political-strategic choices and
strategic trajectories in order to influence
global events and globalising politics. Before
addressing these, a caveat is necessary. We
recognise ‘however’ that elite-led geopolitical
(re)positioning of states is fraught with diffi-
culties and, ‘at best’ is characterised as a frag-
ile accomplishment. Most clearly, state elites
do not have the means or capability to con-
trol the quicksilver of state sovereignty with
its leaky, permeable boundaries and increas-
ingly contested political spaces, in which
other actors and civil society shape the deter-
mination and (multiple) expression of
national interest and identity.
First is the shift in economic power over
the last decade among the global community
of states, most notably towards Brazil, Russia,
India and China (BRICS), catalysing change
in the global geopolitical and geostrategic
order; second is the concomitant implica-
tions this is now having for forms of state-
craft and diplomatic practice in the 21st
century; and third is the growing realisation
among political elites of ‘the increasing role
which geographically related . . . resources . . .
have on international relations and diplo-
macy’ (Criekkemans 2011, p. 714). Most
especially, geographic quantities that con-
tinue to be regarded as inert by scholars of
international relations (IR) are self-evidently
mutable and often highly geopolitically
charged – for instance, constructions of terri-
tory, notions of diplomatic ‘propinquity’ and
‘distance’, and the geographic influences
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underpinning that most opaque geopolitical
category, ‘the national interest’. Geopolitical
(re)positioning, as Dijkink (1996, p. 11)
reminds us, concerns the ‘relation between
one’s own and other places, involving feel-
ings of (in) security or (dis)advantage (and/
or) involving ideas about a collective mission
or foreign policy strategy’. The ongoing
reconfiguration of neoliberalism following
the financial crises of 2008–10 has had with-
out question a profoundly traumatic impact
upon these relations, feelings and ideas yet,
the geopolitical and geostrategic implications
(and reactions) for specific states of this have
received scant attention. This (re)positioning
thus encapsulates what Dijkink (1996, p. 16)
describes as new ‘geopolitical visions’ in
which political elites attempt to (re)config-
ure and (re)articulate national identities in
order to broaden the range of geopolitical
and geostrategic choices and possibilities for
states. Moreover, the neo-liberal crisis has
meant that repositioning is not only the pre-
occupation of elite cadres but also intrinsic
to the efforts of various (dis)affected domes-
tic groups to fashion and articulate new posi-
tions towards private and public interests,
elected governments and trans-border forms




Here we undertake a preliminary overview
of contemporary geopolitical repositioning
strategies by states. Analysis of geopolitical
repositioning thus contributes to political
geographical debates conceptualising states
as ensembles of projects, actions, and mate-
rial presences and absences of identity, and
to states’ contribution to the (in)coherence
of the global geopolitical imagination
(Agnew et al. 2008). Important in this regard
is how territory – one of the wellsprings of
national sovereignty and identity – is recast
through historical experience and social
practice to become a crucial signifier in for-
eign policy metanarratives and discourses
(Rembold & Carrier 2011).
In our view, such a focus also speaks to
recent developments in critical IR on the
practices structuring global geopolitics,
where the lexicon of state practice and the
role of diplomacy in national image projec-
tion give the semblance of order and mean-
ing to the global community of states (Adler
& Pouliot 2011). Unquestionably, geopoliti-
cal repositioning is a contested process. This
follows as a direct consequence of states’ fun-
damentally ‘peopled’, contingent, and multi-
scaled character, both domestically (for
example, contrasting elite and civil society
perspectives on states’ ‘place in the world’)
and internationally (arising from competing
diplomatic visions and representations, and
discourses enacted at numerous diplomatic
sites and negotiating fora). Hence we argue
that geopolitical repositioning derives from
the untidy bundle of government-civic society
relations, rival identity constructions and
global-local diplomatic encounters, meaning
that state ‘agents struggle to endow [states’
position] with political validity and legitimacy
. . . but this is a hard work of reification and
power struggle’ for political elites (Adler &
Pouliot 2011, p. 25). Unbundling state repo-
sitioning, then, is complex, comprising in
our opinion at least four substantive
elements.
First is the ‘political production of terri-
tory’. Any state strategy is reliant on how the
territory of states is, and has been, used and
manipulated for political effect historically.
By this we mean the ways in which national
frontiers, local territories, boundaries and
borders have been used as sites of flows of
people, goods, ideas and capital over time.
For political theorists and political geogra-
phers, territory has fundamental importance
to these political mobilisations. Political
geography is now reconsidering the funda-
mental significance of territory as a dynamic
quantity ‘best understood through . . . an
examination of the relation of the state to
the emergence of a category of “space”’
(Elden 2010, p. 810). Understanding how
territory shapes the possible repertoire of
repositioning strategies of states thus means
grappling with its different manifestations
and their fluctuating significance as a geopol-
itical resource, to reveal ‘a continuum of
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practices and discourses of territorialities’
(Paasi 2003, p. 119). This shaping and
reshaping of territory over time is crucial to
geopolitical repositioning. It encompasses,
for example, states’ production of new politi-
cal spaces by establishing border regimes,
and states’ management of their internal ter-
ritorial order, including symbolic, infrastruc-
tural and institutional techniques to
structure and subdue (Elden 2005, 2010).
Second, repositioning depends on ‘states’
self-identity and technologies of state order-
ing’. This is closely allied to political con-
structions of territory, for ‘geopolitics is
influenced by the state context from which
it is approached’ (Moisio & Paasi 2013,
p. 256). While ostensibly bearing little rela-
tion to it, the mastering of states’ self and
communal identities (Agnew & Corbridge
1995; Agnew 2003) through technologies of
cartography, diplomacy, population statistics,
political parties, sectoral management and
infrastructural planning is thus highly influ-
ential in shaping projection globally of state
identities. So historically, national cultural,
linguistic and historic identities have proven
to be potent referents for developing inter-
state relations of one sort or another: ‘effec-
tive foreign policy rests upon a shared sense
of national identity, of a nation-state’s “place
in the world”, its friends and enemies, its
interests and aspirations. These underlying
assumptions are embedded in national his-
tory and myth, changing slowly over time as
political leaders reinterpret them and exter-
nal and internal developments reshape
them’ (Hill 1996, p. 8). In particular,
national identities provide discursive codes
for ‘us’ and ‘them’: ‘us’ are states with simi-
lar allegiances, interests, and affiliations;
‘them’, states that are contrary or conflicting
in their outlook and interests, in effect the
‘other’, prompting (variously) dependence,
acquiescence, or opposition. In this sense,
state self-identities are indeed an anchor of
geopolitical imaginations (Agnew et al. 2008).
Most clearly, these identities underpin the
range of possibilities for fashioning new posi-
tioning strategies, as ‘National identity is still
one of the most potent forces in the interna-
tional system – embodied in the nation state,
it has served as a rallying call in the develop-
ment of national projects’ (Garson 2004,
p. 198) with respect to other states.
In turn, these two constituents inform
‘practices of statecraft/diplomatic place-
making at a distance’ – that is, individual
and collective diplomatic practices which in
most cases materialise spatially. Geopolitical
positioning is fundamentally a set of state-
craft practices that serve to validate and legit-
imise particular narratives of national
identity in order to advance or secure practi-
cal geopolitical objectives; practices in this
case are ‘socially meaningful patterns of
action, which, in being performed more or
less competently, simultaneously embody, act
out, and possibly reify background knowl-
edge and discourse in and on the material
world’ (Adler & Pouliot 2011, pp. 4–5). Reaf-
firming existing positioning strategies and
crafting new strategies is thus reliant on per-
sonal insight, specific texts and diplomatic
scripts, as well as individual diplomatic
performances and actions. Crucially place-
making at a distance is a fundamental diplo-
matic requirement of state positioning that
coheres from these individual acts, per-
formed by ‘real people, who – working via
network channels, across national borders,
organizational divides, and in the halls of
government – affect political, economic, and
social events’ (Adler & Pouliot 2011, p. 18).
Lastly, ‘geopolitical imaginaries (codes and
visions) for geopolitical repositioning’ imbri-
cate these three constituents – that is, guide
and/or ‘map on’ to uses of territory/territor-
iality for geopolitical effect (for example,
claims to ‘geographical uniqueness’), embed-
ded notions of state self-identity (e.g. states
acting as a cultural ‘bridge’, or a bastion of
particular ‘values’), and particular forms of
diplomatic action – by being mobilised as
part of a purposive geopolitical strategy
(Dijkink 1996; Grygiel 2006; Clark & Jones
2012; Jones & Clark 2013). Rationales for
(re)positioning by states might include to
deepen or to distance affiliations with other
states; to address perceived issues of ‘differ-
ence’ or hierarchy; to promote ‘influence’ or
‘status’ with other countries; and/or to ensure
membership of particular state collectivities,
such as regional trade blocs or global gover-
nance structures.
150 ALUN JONES & JULIAN CLARK
VC 2016 Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG
We examine this process of geopolitical
repositioning within the global geopolitical
imagination through empirical consideration
of Iceland (using Icelandic diplomatic inter-
views conducted in English and supported by
English language-based literatures some of
which written by Icelanders); apposite, as it is
a country in flux following zealous adherence
to global neoliberalism; yet, simultaneously,
its political classes and people are seeking to
fashion a distinctive political and territorial
presence in the contemporary geopolitical
imagination (Wade & Sigurgeirsdottir 2012;
Bergmann 2014). Iceland offers a novel
empirical perspective too, for ‘the dominant
presentations and practices constituting the
modern geopolitical imagination have been
overwhelmingly those of the political elites of
the Great Powers, those states [with] the
capacity to write the political economic
agenda of others, defining appropriate stand-
ards of conduct and providing the framing
for interstate relations with which others must
conform’ (Agnew 1998 p. 10). With some
notable exceptions, the political geographic
processes behind the positioning of more
marginal states, such as Iceland, have been
largely overlooked by political geographers.
Our focus here is on the use of the
‘uniqueness’ imaginary as a geopolitical strat-
egy to create a new geopolitical positioning
for Iceland towards ‘EUrope’ in the wake of
the kreppa (literally ‘collapse’), which saw a
heavy fall in national GDP and left the island
state on the verge of bankruptcy in 2008–9.
In addition to efforts to reposition post-crash
Iceland towards the EU, there was also a
simultaneous realisation that reinforcing Ice-
land’s Nordic credentials could provide an
important restorative of the state’s tarnished
geopolitical standing. The exploitation of
these credentials to ‘legitimize certain actions
and justify specific political orientations’
(Moisio et al. 2011, p. 244) is a long standing
part of the Nordic dynamic. This latest inter-
play between Icelandic geopolitical imagina-
ries of uniqueness in ‘EUrope’ and
positioning in the Nordic family is also exam-
ined drawing on over 50 interviews with Ice-
landic, Nordic, and other EU diplomatic
sources conducted during 2010–13. These
interviews were conducted by the authors in
Reykjavik, Brussels, London, Dublin, and
Vienna. Repeated interviews were held with
mobile respondents across European diplo-
matic spaces. This enabled us to put Icelan-
dic foreign policy and its daily transaction,
firmly in view. These were therefore not
respondents falling into an occasional survey
for researchers to try to draw out what they
really think or know, but individual diplo-
mats who were prepared to talk candidly
based on, in some cases, over 15 years of
connection with the authors. Responses were
also triangulated through comments and
materials from other diplomatic sources
including senior Danish, Norwegian, US and
British representatives.
We consider diplomats as intrinsic to the
production of geopolitics – they make and
project geopolitical representations, and in
doing so make claims, try to convince others
of their veracity, and expend considerable
efforts in sustaining these representations.
Indeed, they are, as one author describes,
‘the plumbers’ of geopolitics (Gould-Davies
2013, p. 1460). Diplomats devise, trial, make
claims and counter-claims about geopolitical
representations and play a critical role in
maintaining the chimera of state permanence
and solidity in an era of profound change in
polities globally (cf. Painter & Jeffrey 2009).
Diplomatic practice underwrites this illusion
of state presence, by ordering and legitimising
state identities nationally and internationally.
Diplomacy is therefore central to the geopolit-




Geographical uniqueness has been widely
used as a discursive formulation by state
elites in their international relations (Jones
& Clark 2013). Clearly, politicians and diplo-
mats of many states have deployed geograph-
ical exceptionalism of one sort or another to
support specific geopolitical visions and iden-
tities. For these state elites, such narratives
are not merely forms of national branding
but, rather, set out ways in which states can
relate to, and secure political advantages
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from, world and regional orders. Crucially,
they provide a means for conducting and
shaping political behaviours and interactions.
As Yanik (2009, p. 532) explains, these narra-
tives ‘do not merely imply imaginations or
representations regarding the geographical
location of a country . . . They also give us
clues to the international role and the iden-
tity a state aspires to, or plans to become’.
Critically, while narratives of ‘uniqueness’
might on the surface ‘denote only geography
. . . in reality, [they] combine geographical
imaginations, role and identity. These [narra-
tives] . . . are indeed discursive strategies
employed [by elites] . . . to frame and to jus-
tify various foreign policy goals’ (Yannik
2009, p. 533). Exploring the dynamics of the
political use of geographical uniqueness and
the attendant domestic and transnational
consequences therefore offers a potentially
fruitful line of geopolitical enquiry. Contex-
tualising the political dynamics associated
with the use of discursive formulations is
especially important to this enquiry.
Since Icelandic independence in 1944, suc-
cessive governments have adopted various
means to project and position the state inter-
nationally, as well as being forced to respond
to Icelandic geopolitical casting by others.
Consequently, Iceland joined NATO in 1949,
signed a defence agreement with the US in
1951, became part of the European Free
Trade Association in 1970, and intensified its
relations with the EU through membership
of the European Economic Area (EEA) in
1994, and participation in the Schengen
Area from 1996. These geopolitical position-
ings buttressed particular national identities
and offered the Icelandic state a sense of
location in the world.
The financial crisis of 2008 was cataclysmic
for the Icelandic state, prompting a major
loss of public trust in government and conse-
quent rapid erosion of state legitimacy espe-
cially in international context. This financial
collapse produced what might be described
as a post-hegemonic trauma involving funda-
mental changes in popular views of the state,
its operation and geopolitical positioning,
that is, a situation bearing all the hallmarks
of what Taylor would describe as a ‘geopoliti-
cal transiton’ (Taylor 1990; see also Sidaway
& Power 2005). European Union member-
ship was perceived by the new Social Demo-
cratic Alliance (SDA) leadership as the only
vehicle that could bring much needed stabil-
ity to Icelandic politics and serve as a refuge
for the ruptured national economy following
the overzealous commitment by previous gov-
ernments to neoliberal ideologies (Berg-
mann 2014). The country’s fiercely
independent character has emerged from,
and has been shaped by, its relation with
Europe, for while Iceland’s parliament
(Alpingi) lays claim to being one of the
world’s oldest democratic assemblies,
national sovereignty has been won from
Europe only recently. Thus, the country’s
700-year colonial heritage as part of Norwe-
gian and Danish kingdoms informs national
scepticism and wariness of European political
affiliations, albeit through a European prism
of cultural closeness (Benediktsson 2003).
Nonetheless, Icelandic wariness was com-
pelled to cede ground to political pragma-
tism as ‘EUrope’ appeared able to offer a
ready-made financial and economic shelter
for the troubled state (Wade 2008, 2009).
This change in national context and dis-
cursive construction of ‘EUrope’ as a geopol-
itical shelter brought about a reformulation
of Icelandic geopolitical visions and a re-
articulation of geographical representations
necessary to justify such a significant change
in its foreign policy. Iceland’s participation
in European co-operation would be under-
pinned by a deeply inscribed national spirit
of independence, itself conditioned by the
country’s colonial history and a highly dis-
tinctive physiographic situation as a small
island state with extreme weather and sur-
rounded by hostile, though highly produc-
tive, fishing seas. This was presented in the
following way: ‘Iceland would be the smallest
and most sparsely populated member of the
EU. Iceland would be the most westerly
member state, remotely situated and faced
with harsh natural conditions. It would be
the only one located in its entirety within the
Arctic region. These unique features will
shape the negotiations in the months to
come’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010,
p. 1). The Icelandic diplomatic corps, espe-
cially its small Brussels-based mission, under
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the guidance of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, had the task of communicating this
new state positioning. Following the formal
application to the EU for membership in
2009, the Icelandic government published in
July 2010 a document mapping out Iceland’s
geopolitical future with ‘EUrope’ and the dis-
cursive boundary conditions that it hoped
would steer the accession process, based on a
complex interweaving of historical experi-
ence, national identity, and cultural practices
sutured together in a representation of geo-
graphical uniqueness (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2010). For Icelandic diplomats it pro-
vided an essential script for the balance of
future discussions, in which the State could
be portrayed not as a microcosm of the inter-
national financial crisis but, rather, as having
made a rational calculated decision on mem-
bership as part of a much longer process of
EU–Icelandic integration efforts, as a well-
placed diplomat explained: ‘The beginning
of this [27 July 2010] document ‘Where did
we come from? What is Iceland?’ Is it only
the country that tried to become a banking
superpower and fell on its face’? No, we are
more than that. That was just something that
happened in Iceland in some five-year boom
time’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
respondent, 2010). This view was amplified
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ossur
Skarpheðinsson, who described it as the ‘logi-
cal next step’ in the development of Ice-
land’s long-standing relationship with
Europe (quoted in Benediktsson 2010, p. 6),
an important discursive signal ahead of any
formal negotiations with a powerful EU
group. Geographical uniqueness was thus the
essential discursive element in Icelandic dip-
lomatic efforts, facilitating tacit and spoken
communication in diplomatic interactions
over potential EU membership.
The diplomatic use of geographical unique-
ness for Icelandic positioning led to three
strategies being deployed by Icelandic diplo-
mats, what Adler-Nissen (2008) describes as
compensatory, missionary and self-censorship.
Compensatory diplomatic strategies involve
limiting the negative effects of uniqueness
arguments to European integration dynamics,
seeing Icelandic membership of the EU as a
positive inducement for EU member states,
not least through the playing of the Arctic
card and Iceland’s centrality to an EU envi-
sioning of the high latitudes, and re-
emphasising Iceland’s historical engagement
and connections with Europe and also its
shared Nordic identity (Moisio et al. 2011;
Jones & Clark 2013). Missionary diplomatic
strategies are much more uncompromising in
nature, with uniqueness presented diplomati-
cally as a national geographical emblem, a
lynchpin of Icelandic identity to be protected
from ‘EUrope’. As an Icelandic diplomat
explained, ‘We are blunt and at times very
blunt. It names the things as they are; it says
what we think’ (MFA respondent 2010). Dip-
lomatic self-censorship strategies are cogni-
sant of the serious loss of national standing
and credibility as a result of fiscal collapse
and are sensitive to member states concerns,
leading to intensified diplomatic efforts to
minimise further loss of national status and
accompanying international marginalisation.
This dominant interpretive background of
uniqueness thus not only conditioned Icelan-
dic diplomatic interactions, reasoning, and
planning for negotiations with the EU but
also defined the ‘horizon of possibility, and
provided the background knowledge of
expectations, dispositions, skills, techniques,
and rituals that are the basis for the constitu-
tion of practices and their boundaries’ (Adler
& Pouliot 2011, p. 17).
With the European Commission warmly
approving the Icelandic application in Febru-
ary 2010 and the European Council unani-
mously endorsing this view in June 2010,
pressure mounted on the SDA and its cham-
pion of EU membership, Foreign Minister
Ossur Skarpheðinsson, to find ways to secure
domestic support for membership of the EU
in the face of considerable public and politi-
cal opposition (Wade & Sigurgeirsdottir
2010). Crucially, (re)positioning of the Ice-
landic state would depend upon how diplo-
mats could secure advantages from deploying
geographical uniqueness in European nego-
tiations, and how receptive the EU negotiat-
ing side would be to it, thereby offering
reassurance to domestic audiences over the
safeguarding of vital national interests in the
agricultural and fisheries sectors. As an Ice-
landic diplomatic source explained, ‘Europe
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celebrates differences. Europe acknowledges
differences and takes them into account.
This is the general principle . . . We are cer-
tainly different . . . We are saying we are dif-
ferent and we would like this to be taken
into account’ (MFA respondent, 2010). How-
ever, contrasting views both within and
between elite and civil society groups over
this (re)positioning strategy were reflected in
the astute comments of an Icelandic parlia-
mentary source ‘a large proportion of the
nation would say membership of the Euro-
pean Economic area (EEA) is enough. But
others argue it is not. And crucially people
do not agree on why! But I think it is fair to
say that the currency question after the col-
lapse has been a major issue. There is a mul-
titude of other issues, of course, and people
take different positions on their relative
importance. Some people say EU member-
ship is needed because of this, others say
because of that. Some look at it from the cul-
tural side – you know, “We should be part of
the European family”; others say “we cannot
run our small economy without being part of
a whole, with a stable currency”. And then
the opponents say, “we have a relatively good
life, being members of the EEA. We can
get all the benefits of the free market, and
joining the Union would just add extra bur-
dens in terms of extra regulation. We should
instead be looking to trade more freely in all
directions, not just with Europe”. These, and
other reasons, including the issues of the
very valuable fishing grounds and the wealth
of natural resources we have, come into the
equation’ (Parliamentary respondent 2010).
There were wide-ranging implications for
the EU of accepting the metanarrative of Ice-
landic uniqueness. The Icelandic position on
the uniqueness of its fisheries sector came in
for particular criticism by the European
Commission on three levels (Jones & Clark
2013). First, that the Icelanders were deliber-
ately misrepresenting EU policy on fishing
access and quotas; second, an erroneous
belief that the fisheries sector in Iceland is
more sensitive than elsewhere in the EU; and
third, the overt suspicion by Icelanders that
the Commission could not be trusted to rep-
resent Icelandic fisheries’ interests within
and beyond ‘EUrope’– three points that go
to the heart of the sovereignty debate in EU
governance and the ability of the Commis-
sion to work alongside member states in the
project of integration. Fisheries, regarded as
the ‘lifeblood of the Icelandic economy’
(MFA 2010, p. 1), presented the most intrac-
table problem as two comments from a Com-
mission source make apparent ‘Iceland
thinks that they are so unique in fisheries
but in fact in several member states this is
just as sensitive an issue. Spain is one, Portu-
gal another. And these member states allow
these decisions to be taken in Brussels . . .
And . . . every other country trusts the Com-
mission to represent their interests in a
neutral and unbiased way’ (European Com-
mission respondent 2011).
Consequently by the summer of 2012,
negotiations between Iceland and the EU
over fisheries had still to be opened. Con-
flicting outlooks and interests between Ice-
land and ‘EUrope’ over geographical
uniqueness began to emerge publicly,
prompting diplomats to slow down member-
ship talks. By January 2013 the diplomatic
clock on EU negotiations was stopped
entirely as national elections planned for the
spring loomed. Diplomats in Brussels had
calculated electoral gains for those parties
opposing EU membership as a geopolitical
(re)positioning strategy, a point expressed
lucidly by a Norwegian diplomatic source:
‘Now the problem is you have elections in
2013 and probably – with the way polls stand
today – have a new government in April. And
will this new government want to continue
with these negotiations? Well, that will
depend on a number of things. Even a new
government which is negative towards mem-
bership might decide to conclude them, you
know, the people will have the opportunity
to say yes or no. But if they are very far from
conclusion, you can guess what a new govern-
ment opposed to accession might say. You
know, “the voters knew we were against going
in, we see we are very far from a positive out-
come, we’ll not continue them”. I don’t want
to be negative, but you know that is a sce-
nario that’s likely . . . But this is the scenario
that many of us foresee. But this idea of stop-
ping the negotiation clock may well pop up
again. It might even be the case they hold a
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referendum on continuing the negotiation
alongside the election. It’s possible. And if
you have situation towards the end of the
year where it turns out – where it becomes
visible to everyone, on fisheries for instance –
that negotiations are impossibly difficult, and
will never lead to the result that Iceland
wants, It’s going to be tremendously difficult
for the Government – and for the forces
inside the Government that are anyway
against – to agree to continue, because of
the drag effect this would have on the out-
come of the spring election’.
(RE) NEW POSITIONINGS OF ICELAND:
THE NORDIC FAMILY
European integration is valued, debated and
reasoned differently in the various Nordic
countries, and the whole concept of
‘EUrope’ is arguably being actualised differ-
ently in their politics. In many ways, this
denotes ‘as much regional disintegration as
integration and unity’ (Moisio et al. 2011, p.
244) and reflects the various political histor-
ies and experiences of the individual Nordic
states. The interplay between Iceland’s Euro-
pean and Nordic geopolitical positionings
has always been an intriguing one, catalysing
a range of geopolitical developments. For
example, there was free movement of people
(i.e. an open border regime in the Nordic
countries) long before this was the case in
Europe. In turn, this was an important
rationale for Iceland and Norway, the two
non-EU Nordic states, to join the EU’s
Schengen area; without doing so, Schengen
would have to have established an outer bor-
der between Norway and Sweden, a situation
described by a senior Icelandic diplomat as
‘unthinkable’ for the Nordic countries (MFA
respondent, 2013). Moreover, relations
between Nordic states within the EU and Ice-
land have subtly changed. So following Swe-
den’s and Finland’s accession to the EU in
1995, ‘there was a kind of impact on Nordic
co-operation in the sense that many thought
Sweden and Finland would give priority to
their new status as EU member states . . .
[leading to] a cooling of relations with us
and Norway’ (MFA source, 2013). However,
while noting that this ‘sort of changed the
dynamics and the relations of the Nordic
family to a certain extent’ in the years imme-
diately following the 1995 accession, this
respondent maintained ‘co-operation and
the dynamics of the Nordic group reverted
to what it always had been’, while among the
Nordic-3 (Sweden, Finland, Denmark) within
the EU an influential Nordic presence is now
beginning to emerge in security and defence
policy. For example, Sweden and Finland
have signed agreements on defence and
security co-operation; and within the EU and
NATO both were among the most commit-
ted partners in recent military operations in
Libya and Afghanistan.
With the failure in 2008 of Iceland’s neo-
liberal experiment to recast the country as
international financial powerhouse came
realisation that reinforcing Iceland’s Nordic
credentials could provide an important
restorative of the state’s tarnished geopoliti-
cal standing. This could be achieved by the
Icelandic case for EU membership being sup-
ported and furthered by the EU’s own Nor-
dic members, and close diplomatic relations
among Nordic states enabling Icelandic dip-
lomats to draw upon previous Nordic acces-
sion negotiations with ‘EUrope’ be they
successful (Denmark, and later Sweden, Fin-
land) or unsuccessful (Norway). Iceland, of
course, has profoundly close historical and
cultural ties with the Nordic states, based on
a legacy of colonial occupation (the island
was part of Danish and Norwegian kingdoms
from the twelfth century onwards, with inde-
pendence only achieved in the mid-twentieth
century), migration, trading and commercial
links, and aesthetic associations through one
of Europe’s oldest forms of literary expres-
sion, the sagas. Thus it was natural that, run-
ning parallel to attempts to position and to
align Icelandic interests more closely with
the EU in the wake of the kreppa, a geopoliti-
cal strategy was launched to further enhance
co-operation with the ‘Nordic family’. This
was understandable given their cultural close-
ness and amounting, at one level, to a simple
reaffirmation of the country’s geopolitical
identity and cultural heritage.
Importantly however, this repositioning
also sought to build upon the immediate
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response of the Nordic countries to offer Ice-
land much needed financial support in the
aftermath of the financial crisis; indeed, they
were among the first states to offer material
assistance to the stricken Icelandic economy
in September 2008. Yet even within the Nor-
dic family, Iceland’s diplomatic presence
remains viewed through the prism of histori-
cal circumstance. Thus, asked to reflect on
Iceland’s position among the Nordic states, a
senior figure in Norway’s diplomatic service
in Reykjavik commented: ‘This is obviously
not the biggest Embassy we have – It’s a
small outfit we have here, and that suits the
place of the country we’re in. So of course if
you ask me, Stockholm or Copenhagen, well,
they probably are the really important post-
ings among the Nordic states, you know,
highly political. I would say this is, err, an
interesting posting, considered to be interest-
ing, but as you can imagine not one of the
most high profile, obviously’.
Partly this view – which is strongly imbued
with inflections of diplomatic ‘difference’
and hierarchy – reflects intertwined colonial
histories, and rivalries, between Reykjavik
and Oslo. Equally, however, it reflects a
strong concern in Iceland’s Ministry of For-
eign Affairs that financial mismanagement in
the wake of the kreppa had caused substantial
damage to the Icelandic geopolitical pres-
ence globally, but especially within the Nor-
dic region. To address this situation, since
2008 MFA’s efforts have focused efforts on
restoring the country’s diplomatic standing
through formal mechanisms of Nordic for-
eign policy co-operation.
Informal co-operation between Nordic
states goes back to the 1950s, with the signing
of the Helsinki Treaty in 1962 formalising
these arrangements and enabling a deepen-
ing and broadening of Nordic collaboration
and mutual aid since that time. Under the
Helsinki Treaty, a parliamentary assembly, the
Nordic Council, was established, bringing
together representatives from the democrati-
cally elected chambers of parliament from all
Nordic countries to discuss common co-
operation and to identify mutually beneficial
issues for collaboration; this was followed in
1971 by the creation of the intergovernmen-
tal forum of the Nordic Council of Ministers,
an executive body whose powers have sub-
stantively increased through binding legal
agreements and treaties made by its signato-
ries. Iceland’s role since 2008 has been to
make more expansive, creative and proactive
use of both fora, with the aim of finding com-
mon areas of interest between all Nordic
states through Iceland acting as broker and
facilitator. Thus renewed emphasis has been
placed by the MFA on building resource
management initiatives (over fisheries with
Norway), and strengthening foreign and secu-
rity policy (such as with fellow NATO states
Sweden). The latter initiative capitalises on
change in global geopolitical dynamics with
the collapse of the USSR enabling Sweden
and Finland to play more active roles in a dis-
tinctive Nordic foreign and security policy.
This contrasts with the Cold war period,
when the three Nordic states were ‘somewhat
compromised, with Sweden in a state of neu-
trality, Finland with special relations with the
USSR, and Iceland in effect occupied by US
armed forces’ (MFA source, 2013). All this
reduced enormously the potential for foreign
policy and security policy among the Nordic
states.
Post 2008, the interplay between Nordic
and European positionings has created new
geopolitical dynamics between Iceland and
Nordic states ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the EU. It has,
for example, created closer affinities between
Iceland and Norway, as the two states that –
as recent events in Iceland have confirmed –
are resolutely opposed to EU membership,
despite significant domestic minority opinion
in favour of accession. But it has also
strengthened domestic relations with Den-
mark, which deepened during Iceland’s
vexed EU accession process. The net result
for the Icelandic state of the flux and flow
between these two geopolitical positioning
strategies has been to consolidate what are
seen as established strengths of Icelandic
statecraft, namely promoting the country’s
perceived expertise in natural resource man-
agement with Europe; acting as a ‘venue
space’ in the high latitudes for Nordic
co-operation on energy and logistical support
for fossil fuel prospecting; while attempting
to build a geopolitical case for the country to
be seen as a legitimate ‘Arctic state’, and a
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staging post for Arctic exploration. This lat-
ter positioning of Iceland has, however,
proved contentious, not least with the other
Nordic states.
Iceland’s perceived expertise in natural
resource management is predicated on a sus-
tainable fisheries policy, based on a transfera-
ble quotas system which has been widely
credited with influencing recent change in
the EU’s own antiquated Common Fisheries
Policy. This has provided a valuable basis for
deepening bilateral relations with Norway,
focused on what is now described as ‘respon-
sible resource management’ (applying to fish
and other living marine resources). There
has been disagreement on some concrete
issues, such as over mackerel quota – but
such disagreements have been minor com-
pared with the disputes on this topic between
Iceland and the EU leading to action being
taken by the European Commission in 2013.
More important in Iceland’s efforts to reaf-
firm its geopolitical position among the Nor-
dic family is its contentious handling of the
country’s role in Arctic policy. A growing
awareness and renewed interest in the Arctic
and the ‘High North’ link all the Nordic
states, most clearly because of their geo-
graphic proximity. Nordic co-operation over
this issue relates to manifest transport, tour-
ism and resource exploitation challenges, but
there is also recognition that these chal-
lenges bring a renewed security dimension to
reshape the Nordic relationship, and to
strengthen the rationale for Nordic, rather
than European co-operation. Critical to this
from Iceland’s perspective is legitimising its
claim as an Arctic state. This claim has been
tempered by the Ilulissat declaration made in
2008 by a grouping of five states within the
Arctic Council (of which Iceland is a mem-
ber) called the Arctic-5 (A-5). The Declara-
tion sets out an agreement between Ministers
from the US, Russia, Canada, Norway and
Denmark (attending on behalf of Green-
land) that the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) should be
the basis for any dispute or any claim or any
management action in the Arctic Ocean.
This has major implications for Iceland’s
geopolitical positioning strategy as an Arctic
state, as a senior Nordic diplomat com-
mented: ‘One important difference between
us is that Iceland is not what we refer to as a
coastal state of the Arctic Ocean. That is a
question of pure geography, although the
Icelanders don’t like us speaking about their
place in relation to the Arctic, or indeed
about what we call the A-5 coastal states. This
has become apparent on a few occasions at
Ministerial level. Now, of course, if you look
at a map, Iceland does not have a coast on
the Arctic Ocean; It’s not placed there. You
have Greenland here, Svalbard there, and
Iceland right down here; there’s no conti-
nental Icelandic shelf or coastline going up
from Iceland to the Arctic Ocean. Now we
agree with the Icelanders that we don’t want
to move any of the key decision-making out
of the Arctic Council. The Icelanders are
very keen, they insist very strongly that the
Arctic Council should be the main, the only
body dealing with Arctic issues, and we agree
with them that the Arctic Council is the
main body. But we have met with others in
the A-5. And we think the Arctic Ocean is a
separate entity, a meaningful and logical
basis for meeting, discussing and agreeing
among those states that abut the Ocean’.
Icelandic efforts to find a new geopolitical
role relative to the Arctic continue, but
recent efforts to locate the secretariat of the
Arctic Council in Reykjavik have not been
successful and tend to show again the covert
hierarchical distinctions made in geopolitical
positioning between the members of the
Nordic family as explained by a Norwegian
diplomatic source: ‘Maintaining a strong Arc-
tic Council has meant the creation of a Per-
manent Secretariat. The Icelanders suggested
that this Secretariat should be based here in
Reykjavik, but the position was made that it
should be in Tromso, and I think everyone’s
comfortable with that now’.
Iceland’s reaffirmation of its Nordic posi-
tioning post 2008 thus demonstrates that
deepening and extending existing strategies
takes time and considerable investment by
states. Specifically, it requires fashioning of a
clear geostrategic vision, co-ordination of
multiple sites of diplomatic engagement and
points of diplomatic contact, and a prepared-
ness to defend at all times the geopolitical
codes that underpin these visions. While
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Iceland is widely credited with possessing a
focused, highly professional diplomatic
cadre, the state apparatus faces a strong chal-
lenge to establish its Arctic credentials
among the Nordic states and the A-5 group-
ing within the Arctic Council. Pragmatically
therefore, in future the country may have to
settle for crafting a position for itself as a
gateway to the Arctic, building on its existing
logistical and emergency response capabil-
ities in the high latitudes, rather than as a
state actively contesting claims over the vast
natural resources of this debatable territory.
REPOSITIONING OF ICELAND TOWARDS
‘EUROPE’ SINCE 2013
Since April 2013, the new Icelandic govern-
ment has both presented and represented a
new particular identity discourse towards
‘EUrope’ through a diplomatic process that
allows others to understand and interpret its
national interests. As we have seen, Icelandic
national identity is neither ‘natural’ nor
‘given’, but rather the reflection of cultural
and discursive choices made by that state. In
September 2013, Foreign Minister Gunnar
Bragi Sveinsson in a key speech to parliamen-
tarians dismissed the former government’s
geopolitical positioning of the state towards
‘EUrope’ as having been ‘taken without nec-
essary solidarity and conviction in place’ and
a ‘journey commenced in uncertain times in
Iceland-[when] our position was not strong’
(MFA 2013). Moreover, Icelandic national
identity is now being articulated through the
idea of partnership with, rather than mem-
bership of ‘EUrope’ with the ultimate goal of
‘lending more weight and visibility’ to Ice-
land’s European engagements (MFA 2013).
In diplomatic parlance this is ‘a metaphor
about greater, stronger participation short of
membership’ (Diplomatic respondent 2013).
Securing the validity and legitimacy of this
latest geopolitical (re)positioning is
entrusted to frontline Icelandic diplomats.
While the membership application has now
been officially placed ‘on ice’, and only to be
thawed should a national referendum be
requested on the issue, Icelandic diplomats
are eager to avoid this being represented as
a rupture of Icelandic-EU allegiances. Icelan-
dic national interest is now portrayed neces-
sarily as neither conflicting nor contrary to
‘EUrope’ as a diplomatic source explained
‘He [Minister Sveinsson] is saying things very
similar to his predecessor and to his prede-
cessor. For example, he is saying Europe is
very important to us, Europe is our largest
export market, we are a solid European
country with solid European roots and we
want to participate but we just don’t want to
join the EU but we want to strengthen the
EEA agreement’ (Diplomatic respondent
2013). Here, while Icelandic national interest
is in the process of being recast, this is taking
place in a context of proclaimed longstand-
ing European friendship, shared values and
common understandings.
However, geopolitical (re)positionings are,
as we have emphasised, highly contested.
Most pertinently, the status and influence of
‘EUrope’ has been undermined by what
could be argued is Iceland’s refusal of it. In
October 2013, the EU Enlargement Commis-
sioner Stefan Fule expressed his view that
‘we were not that far from being able to pres-
ent the citizens of Iceland with a deal which
would take into account Iceland‘s specific-
ities and at the same time taking into
account the European Union‘s principles’.
There are several reasons for this manoeuvre
by the EU – not least an attempt to project
the new Icelandic Government as being hasty
in its decision to halt talks with the EU and
thereby not serving national interest well; to
encourage pro-EU groups in Iceland to press
for a referendum bid for the restart of talks;
to portray the EU as being receptive to vari-
ous geopolitical circumstances and at the
same time refuting allegations that the break-
down in negotiations was due to an intransi-
gent EU ill-equipped to handle the specific
circumstances of small states like Iceland.
This EU challenge to Iceland was immedi-
ately and forcefully refuted by the Icelandic
Foreign Minister describing it as a ‘rather
free account. The fact of the matter is that
all the major issues in these negotiations
were still unresolved when they were put on
hold. Although many chapters had been
opened and a third closed, it cannot be
maintained that a conclusion was around the
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corner when the chapters on fisheries and
agriculture had not been opened, not to
mention the fact that the EU had not even
completed deliberations on . . . fisheries’
(MFA 2013). The use therefore of geographi-
cal uniqueness to administer, conduct, con-
trol and fix territorial negotiations with
‘EUrope’ has clearly had major reverbera-
tions. Significantly, as the above exchange
demonstrates, it marks above all a distinct
stage in the history of ‘European’ external
relations; a candid assessment by a small
island state of the value of adopting the
structures and policies of an alleged ‘New
‘EUrope’. It signals also a profound question-
ing of the ‘EUropean’ project and its capabil-
ity to offer a safe economic haven for small
nations.
CONCLUSIONS
Closer understanding of the workings and
operation of contemporary elite Europeanisa-
tion spaces, discourses and practices remain
central to the analysis of the diverse expres-
sions and meanings attributed to ‘EUrope’.
We have argued that the mechanisms by
which states outside the EU 28 develop their
positioning strategies and place brandings to
secure maximum advantages from negotiating
with this emerging ‘EUropean’ order are of
particular interest given that ‘the politics of
integration evokes different responses, tactics
and strategies in different geographical con-
texts’ (Moisio et al. 2013, p. 738). We contend
that ‘EUrope’ is both scripted and contested
by ‘outside’ political and diplomatic elites as
part of complex state (re)positioning strat-
egies. Our emphasis is specifically upon the
re-inventions and re-inscriptions of particular
geopolitical representations through which
belonging to ‘EUrope’ can be articulated,
performed and championed, and state (re)po-
sitioning can be fixed. This process of (re)po-
sitioning is inescapably contested and, as we
have shown, fraught with numerous political
challenges as diplomats attempt to bundle
together geographic quantities (territory, loca-
tion, resources, natural conditions) to substan-
tiate a mutable national interest as well as
underpin their advocacy of particular geopol-
itical positionings. The use of geographic
quantities in state-led efforts to structure and
shape international interactions have demon-
strable geopolitical consequences. Their use is
designed to contribute to ‘a state’s supposed
taken for granted status . . . a doubtful particu-
larism . . . turned into universal truths to
justify this or that action’ (Agnew 2009, pp.
431–432) but unquestionably provoke alterna-
tive, often challenging reactions to their
usage.
In this paper, we have responded to recent
calls ‘to explore . . . and explicate how
“Europe” is understood and performed in
political practices in different parts of
Europe’ (Moisio et al. 2013, p. 745). Drawing
upon a case study of Iceland, we have shown
the diplomatic usage of geographical unique-
ness as a state branding practice and strategy,
a pivotal element to state (re)positioning
towards ‘EUrope’ following financial collapse
in 2008. In particular, we have exposed the
different struggles over the use of the geo-
political category of uniqueness, as various
competing and divergent political interests
contest, legitimise or reject it in their politi-
cal entanglements with ‘EUrope’.
Additionally, we have also explored the
localised imaginations and diplomatic articu-
lation of ‘EUrope’ through Iceland’s geopolit-
ical positioning towards other Nordic states
over this same period, and its strategic reaffir-
mation of membership of the Nordic family.
In doing so, we have underlined the complex-
ities and messiness of connecting the politics
of the appropriation and the organisation of
space with elite deployment of geopolitical
discourses and representations for that pur-
pose. Moreover, our exploration of Icelandic
(re)positionings towards ‘EUrope’ and the
Nordic group clearly exposes ‘the success,
strength, and continuity of certain geographi-
cal representations and the volatility of
others’ (Mamadouh 2010, p. 321).
Iceland now finds itself in choppy geopolit-
ical waters. The new government has begun
an active diplomatic campaign for the inter-
national (re)positioning of the state towards
‘EUrope’, the Nordic family, and Arctic
membership and most recently has under-
taken efforts to forge new links with rapidly
growing economies in Asia. Here, the recent
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signing of the bilateral free trade agreement
with China in April 2013 not only encourages
trade and investment between both parties,
but also affirms Icelandic aspirations to be
taken as a serious player in the high latitudes
by facilitating scientific co-operation in
marine and polar scientific matters with
China, and pledging support for Chinese
observer status in the Arctic Council (MFA
2013). What is occurring therefore is nothing
less than a new political production of Ice-
landic territory and the emerging global pro-
jection of a refashioned state identity.
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